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DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1978
Of the more than one hundred federal court opinions dealing with
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during the last year,2 deci-
sions addressing four parts of the Act contributed to the evolution of
judicial construction of the FOIA. One group of cases from the District
of Columbia Circuit sought to clarify the accessibility of documents
that move between federal government entities. A second large group
of cases interpreted the third exemption 3 of the FOIA-nondisclosure
in the presence of a narrowly defined withholding statute-as amended
in 1976. Although these cases are primarily instructive for their exami-
nation of other statutes, rather than the FOIA exemption itself, they do
continue the classification of withholding statutes as "exempting" or
"non-exempting," a classification rooted in the legislative history of the
1976 amendment.4
A third set of cases, including the single FOIA decision from the
Supreme Court in 1978, NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,5 an-
swered specific questions concerning exemption 6 from FOIA disclosure
for certain witness statements and related documents relied on by par-
ticular federal agencies in their investigative capacities. Left un-
resolved by these cases was the broader issue of exemptions for entire
classes of documents other than pre-hearing NLRB witness statements,
an issue especially troubling inasmuch as the FOIA requires de novo
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2. For discussion of developments under the FOIA in prior years, see Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189; Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DuKE L.J. 532; Note, Developments Under the Freedom
of Information Act-1975, 1976 DuKE L.J. 366; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Informa-
lion Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-
1972, 1973 DuKE L.J. 178; Project, FederalAdminitrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 115, 136; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 DuKE L.J. 149, 164;
Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 72.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 880, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2204-05; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 2244, 2260-61.
5. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
6. The cases deal primarily with Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976), for "private"
information and Exemptions 7(A) and 7(C), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(A), (C) (1976), for investigatory
records the disclosure of which would "interfere with enforcement proceedings" or "constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
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review in each case where an exemption is claimed 7 and allows the
court to examine the documents to identify segregable, non-exempt
portions.
The fourth major category of cases adding new dimensions to the
FOIA case law did not technically address a specific portion of the
FOIA. These are the so-called "reverse-FOIA" suits8 initiated by a
submitter of information to a federal agency in an effort to prevent
disclosure in response to a FOIA request. Whether or not the right to
bring such an action may be implied from the language of the Act re-
mains in doubt; the question is central to the split among the circuit
courts regarding the appropriate procedure for obtaining judicial re-
view and the proper standard of review to be applied. A pivotal re-
verse-FOIA case, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,9 is now before the Supreme
Court. One congressional committee 0 suggests legislative resolution,
should the Court fail to provide a definitive clarification of the matter.
This Note discusses these four areas of judicial development under
the Freedom of Information Act and suggests implications for future
FOIA requests.
I. AMBULATORY AGENCY RECORDS: CONTROL AND POSSESSION
The FOIA does not address the problem of physical possession
and actual or constructive control of documents whose location has
changed or could change, nor does it specifically state whether such
documents constitute disclosable "records."" Congress did not antici-
pate the mobile document problem in the legislative history of the Act.
However, three recent District of Columbia cases' 2 discussed aspects of
control and possession: one echoed a 1977 New York district court
case 13 that had held that research data generated by and in the physical
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
8. For more comprehensive discussion of reverse-FOIA suits, see Clement, The Rights of
Submitters To Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Free-
dom oflnformation Act Lawsuit, 55 TExAs L. REv. 587 (1977); Note, Protectionfrom Government
Disclosure-The Reverse-FOI4 Suit, 1976 DUKE L.. 330; Comment, Reverse Freedom of./nforma-
ion Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 995 (1976).
9. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
10. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACr REQUESTS FOR
BUSINESS DATA & REVERSE-FOIA LAwsurrs, H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).
11. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3), (a)(4)(B) (1976).
12. Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Goland v. CIA, 43 Ad. L.2d 407
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C.
1977).
13. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For an extensive
discussion of this decision, see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977,
supra note 2, at 190-92.
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possession of federally funded private researchers did not constitute
"agency records"; another declared that the FOIA gave courts the
power to retrieve documents improperly removed from an agency; the
third held that a congressional hearing transcript physically located in
an agency's files for thirty years still could not be classified as an
agency document.
While the new decision dealing with private research data, For-
sham v. Calfano,14 neither supersedes nor overrules the decision in the
1977 case CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Mathews,15 the three separate opin-
ions in Forsham reinject uncertainties into the question of the degree of
control an agency must have over private research data in order to sub-
ject the data to FOIA requests. Plaintiffs in Forsham and in CIBA-
GEIGY sought disclosure of raw data still in the possession of federally
funded researchers. The data was generated during a study of diabetic
patients that resulted in heightened Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) concern over certain oral hypoglycemic drugs. Neither federal
funding nor FDA access to the data in CIBA-GEIGY was considered
sufficient government control to transform the data into "agency
records." On balance, the FDA's indirect reliance on the data through
a summary report did not outweigh the researchers' private ownership
interests.
Judge Leventhars opinion for the Forsham court stressed the non-
involvement of any government agency in the "core" of the research
program, its daily operations or even in the planning stages of the re-
search project.' 6 He was unwilling to expand the definition of "agency
records" to include documents in someone else's possession that the
agency could obtain but had not yet obtained:' 7 "The governing prin-
ciple is that only if a federal agency has created or obtained a record
(or has a duty to obtain the record) in the course of doing its work, is
there an agency record that can be demanded under FOIA."1 Judge
MacKinnon concurred in the judgment but would have restricted the
decision to the facts of the case, leaving open the question of "the ex-
tent to which FOIA should be interpreted to cover records not created
by, obtained by, or otherwise in the possession of an agency."19
Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Forsham, urged the adoption of the
CIBA-GEIGY standard-government ownership or "substantial Gov-
14. 587 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15. 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
16. 587 F.2d at 1138-39.
17. Id. at 1136.
18. Id. (dictum) (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 1139.
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ernment control or use"2 of the records-measured by the factors of
funding, access and agency reliance. The Forsham dissent considered
agency reliance on the data in its decisionmaking to be the crucial fac-
tor, but in contrast to the CIBA-GEIGY court and the majority opin-
ions in Forsham, Judge Bazelon found the ongoing
FDA/pharmaceutical industry controversy spawned by the test results
to constitute sufficient reliance to warrant disclosure. Unlike the ma-
jority,2 he did not fear the possible "chilling" effect of this specific dis-
closure on the scientific community.22
Two months before the Forsham decision Judge Bazelon wrote an
equally forceful dissent in Goland v. CIA,23 urging that an unpublished
congressional hearing transcript from 1947 that had been housed in
CIA files from that date until the present and had been used by the
CIA to interpret "its organic legislation ' 24 had become an agency rec-
ord25 of the CIA. He noted that agency records often include docu-
ments received from other divisions of the federal government. Judge
Bazelon's view did not prevail; the majority in Goland held the tran-
script to be a congressional record released to the CIA "for limited pur-
poses as a reference document only,"'26 and therefore not subject to
disclosure under the FOIA.
Goland presented the mirror issue to that of Forsham: in Goland,
the agency claimed that the hearing transcript was not under its control
and therefore not disclosable under the FOIA even though the docu-
ment was in the agency's possession; the private research data in For-
sham was claimed not to be disclosable because it was not in the
agency's possession. The congressional source of the Goland transcript
outweighed the fact of agency possession, while the research data in
Forsham remained private largely because it was not in the agency's
possession. At this point, the District of Columbia Circuit Court ap-
pears to be making policy judgments in the middle ground of "con-
trol," areas in which an agency has utilized either the documents or a
summary of them and has relied on them in the course of its opera-
20. 428 F. Supp. at 529.
21. 587 F.2d at 1138-39.
22. Id. at 1147-48.
23. 43 Ad. L.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
24. 43 Ad. L.2d at 434. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, 61 Stat. 495;
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (1976).
25. Congress and its records are not subject to FOIA requests because Congress is not an
"agency" for purposes of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). The relationship between Congress
and documents that are FOIA records, but are exempt from disclosure, is discussed at note 79
inra.
26. 43 Ad. L.2d at 412 (quoting district court's unpublished opinion from the bench (May 26,
1976)).
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tions. Under these circumstances, the court apparently will hold that
the documents should not be disclosed if they are also private materials
or non-FOIA congressional documents. 27 Questions of mixed "owner-
ship" will continue to arise until the courts categorically deny or grant
such documents the status of "agency records."
The third District of Columbia case, Reporters Committeefor Free-
dom of the Press v. Vance,28 addressed the problem of records wrong-
fully transferred between governmental departments. Access was
sought to telephone records made by Henry Kissinger during his tenure
at the State Department. The records had, circuitously, arrived at the
Library of Congress, a branch of Congress not subject to FOIA re-
quests.2 9 Kissinger denied access to both the news media and the Ar-
chivist of the United States who sought to review the records for
permanent historical value. Kissinger also argued that the "plaintiffs
lack[ed] standing under the Federal Records Act to challenge the trans-
fer from the [State] Department."3 In response, the district court
stated that the plaintiffs need not rely on the Federal Records Act31 at
all, particularly "where a statutory retrieval action appears unlikely. 32
As an alternative, the plaintiffs could "invoke the broad equitable pow-
ers granted to the district courts in aid of their role as the 'enforcement
arm' of the Freedom of Information Act' 33 to order the documents re-
turned34 to the State Department, which would presumably make the
27. Judicial proceedings, like congressional documents, are not "agency records" subject to
FOIA disclosure. In an attempt to transform secret grand jury testimony into records obtainable
through the FOIA, Alger Hiss sought release of the testimony to the Justice Department, an FOIA
"agency." Hiss v. Department of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Hiss relied on Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows "disclosure of grand jury proceed-
ings under three and only three circumstances, [one of which is] in connection with or prelimina-
rily to 'a judicial proceeding."' 441 F. Supp. at 70. The FOIA was held not to apply to this
request, since the court considered Rule 6(e) to be an Exemption 3 statute. See text accompanying
notes 40-42 infra. The court need not have addressed the Exemption 3 question; even in the
absence of Rule 6(e), these records would not qualify as FOIA "agency records" since they were
judicial records, not agency records. Under the Forsham, CIB4-GEIGY and Goland standards
the testimony would not constitute "agency records" until and unless the Justice Department ob-
tained physical possession of the documents and relied on them to conduct agency business, be-
yond using them merely as "reference" materials.
28. 442 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1977).
29. See note 25 supra.
30. 442 F. Supp. at 385 (citations omitted).
31. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107 (1976).
32. 442 F. Supp. at 386.
33. Id. at 385-86.
34. The court determined that Kissinger's telephone records were government property be-
cause they were "produced not only in accordance with [State] Department regulations but also on
government time and with the aid of department... resources." 442 F. Supp. at 387. See 41
C.F.R. § 101-11.202-2 (1977). Because the records were government property their disposition
was governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3303a (1976), and removal
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documents accessible through a FOIA request. In this case, neither the
element of privacy central to the Forsham decision nor the involvement
of a non-FOIA congressional office central to the Goland decision pre-
vented the court from granting "agency records" status to documents
wrongfully removed from the agency. Unlike the records involved in
Forsham and Goland, Kissinger's notes were agency records when they
were created and did not lose that character through transfer to a non-
FOIA repository.
II. FEDERAL WITHHOLDING STATUTES AND EXEMPTION 3
As originally enacted, Exemption 335 of the FOIA applied to infor-
mation "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. '36 In 1975
the Supreme Court in FAA v. Robertson3 7 granted Exemption 3 status
to a federal statute38 that allowed an agency to withhold information
whenever, in the agency administrator's judgment, disclosure "would
adversely affect the interests of [the objecting party] and was not re-
quired in the interest of the public." 39 As a result of this decision,"
Congress amended Exemption 3 in 1976 to narrow the range of statutes
that would qualify for exemption. A federal statute falls within the
ambit of the amended version of Exemption 3 only if it "leave[s] no
discretion on the issue" of withholding,41 or, in the alternative, if the
withholding statute specifies the materials to be withheld or the "partic-
ular criteria" to be used in making the decision to withhold.4' Federal
courts examining the amended exemption have, for the most part, re-
lied on the statutory language alone to classify withholding statutes.
For example, in American Jewish Congress v. Kreps43 the court held
that the Export Administration Act of 1969" failed to qualify as an
Exemption 3 statute under either branch of the test set forth in the
amended exemption. The Export Administration Act authorizes the
Secretary of Commerce to require exporters to report requests they re-
to the Library of Congress through any means not authorized by the Records Act was "wrongful."
442 F. Supp. at 387.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
36. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
37. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
38. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976).
39. Id.
40. The amendment's legislative history explicitly states this congressional purpose. H.R.
REP. No. 880, supra note 4, at 22-23.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A) (1976).
42. Id. § 552(b)(3)(B).
43. 574 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
44. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2413 (1976).
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ceive to boycott other countries45 and gives the Secretary discretion to
decide what portion of that information should be released to the pub-
lic.4 6 Because the Secretary has discretion on the issue of withholding,
the Export Administration Act cannot support a FOIA Exemption 3
claim. Further, the only guidance provided by the export statute re-
garding information to be withheld is stated in terms of the "national
interest," 47 language the court found insufficient to establish the "par-
ticular criteria" required under the alternate test of Exemption 3.48
Several federal withholding statutes do qualify under Exemption 3
because they list with sufficient particularity the material to be with-
held. FOIA requests to the CIA, for instance, often give rise to a claim,
which is usually sustained,49 for exemption under section 6 of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.50 Section 6 provides in part that
"the Agency shall be exempted from. . . the provisions of any. . . law
which require[s] the .. .disclosure of the organization, functions,
names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the
Agency."'" The statute exempting National Security Agency docu-
ments may be even more protective: 52 it covers not only personnel in-
formation, but also all functions or activities of the agency itself. 3 The
45. Id. § 2403(c).
46. Id. § 2406(c).
47. Id.
48. 574 F.2d at 631-32.
49. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Social Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373
(9th Cir. 1978) (in the absence of an allegation of agency bad faith, the court's inquiry consists of
two questions, both answered affirmatively in this case: Is there a (b)(3) statute? Is the requested
material exempted by the language of that statute?); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Baker v. CIA, 580 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Goland v. CIA, 43 Ad. L.2d 407 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Exemption 3 status explicitly stated in
legislative history of 1976 amendment); Cerveny v. CIA, 445 F. Supp. 772 (D. Colo. 1978).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976).
51. Id. For an extended discussion of the proper role of a court in reviewing exemption
claims on national security grounds--either for classified documents under Exemption I or CIA
Act documents under Exemption 3--see Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
standard of review utilized in the original January 6, 1977, Weissman opinion, ("the court was not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," Weissman v. CIA, 40 Ad. L.2d 829, 835 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)), was based on outdated and superseded legislative history that was extremely deferen-
tial to the CIA. The amended version of the opinion, dated April 4, 1977, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1977), no longer requires the court to accept without question an agency's affidavits in support of a
national security exemption. Instead, the court will review national security claims de novo as it
does other claims of exemption and if the court finds it necessary to examine the documents in
camera, it may do so. Id. at 696-97. See authorities cited in Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d at 1202-05
nn.14-22 and accompanying text; Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. Pub. L. No. 86-36 § 6(a), 73 Stat. 64 (1959), which reads in part: "nothing in this Act or
any other law. . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function
of the National Security Agency...."
53. Hayden v. National Security Agency, 452 F. Supp. 247, 252 n.17 (D.D.C. 1978). But ef.
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Patent Act 54 also qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute according to the
holding by the Ninth Circuit in Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps.55 Al-
though the Patent Act grants some discretion to the Patent Office Com-
missioner, it does satisfy the alternate test because the statute specifies
the Patent Office records to be withheld. The Act requires secrecy for
applications but does not protect other agency records-decisions, re-
ports and manuals-from disclosure. 6
Federal statutes may also provide exemption from disclosure if the
statute "establishes particular criteria for withholding. 5  The federal
district court in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission58 examined the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)5 9 and
determined that it qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute even though the
"particular criteria" set forth in that statute specify the requirements
for disclosure rather than withholding." The CPSA provides that the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, before disclosing data submit-
ted to it, must assure the accuracy of any information to be disclosed,
the fairness of disclosure and the reasonable relationship between dis-
closure and fulfillment of the purposes of the CPSA.61 The GTESylva-
nia court regarded the determination of "accuracy" and "fairness"
standards required by the CPSA as "more definite and objective"62
than the "public interest" test of the Federal Aviation Act that
Baez v. National Security Agency, 43 Ad. L.2d 820, 825 (D.D.C. 1978) ("language" and "purpose"
of statutes exempting CIA and NSA documents are "almost identical").
54. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976), which provides in full:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark
Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant
or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such
special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner.
55. 577 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1978); accord, Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1056 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976) (pre-1976 amendment case holding that both pending and abandoned patent applications
are exempt from FOIA disclosure); Misegades & Douglas v. Schuyler, 328 F. Supp. 619, 619-20
(E.D. Va. 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 456 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1972) (Patent Act protects "all
pertinent information" related to pending applications).
56. Cf. Irons v. Gottschalk, 548 F.2d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977) (Patent Office decisions not protected from disclosure by § 122).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1976).
58. 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977). See note 186 infra for discussion of the reverse-FOIA
aspects of this case.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
60. 443 F. Supp. at 1160. But cf Mobil Oil v. FTC, 406 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stat-
ute setting forth criteria for disclosure does not satisfy the converse FOIA requirement of a statute
specifying criteria for withholding).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976). In addition, the Commission is absolutely forbidden to
disclose a "trade secret or other [confidential] matter." Id. § 2055(a)(2).
62. 443 F. Supp. at 1158-59.
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prompted the congressional amendment to Exemption 3,63 or the "na-
tional interest" test of the Export Administration Act. Thus, the CPSA
was held to qualify as an Exemption 3 statute. 4 Since the Commission
had failed to meet the accuracy, fairness and fulfillment criteria, it was
enjoined from releasing data exempted from the FOIA by the CPSA.65
Congress may provide protection from FOIA disclosure through
the enactment of statutes meeting the requirements of amended Ex-
emption 3. In addition, however, Congress may completely foreclose
access to information under the FOIA. One such preempting statute is
section 6110 of the Internal Revenue Code, added as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.66 According to the Senate report on the bill, sec-
tion 6110 provides that "the public inspection of rulings, technical ad-
vice memoranda, and determination letters and related background
files could be accomplished only pursuant to the rules and procedures
set forth in the amendment, and not those of any other provision of
law, such as the F O. 67 Court decisions after the effective date of
this section68 have properly denied access to section 6110 materials
through a FOIA request.69
63. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
64. 443 F. Supp. at 1160.
65. According to the Second Circuit, however, the accuracy and fairness standards of the
CPSA "do not apply when the [Consumer Product Safety] Commission merely responds to a
request under the FOIA." Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382, 1385 (2d Cir.
1978). The court of appeals held that the precautions in the CPSA governed only information
released to the general public at the initiative of the Commission. Thus, the court concluded that
it was not necessary to determine the Exemption 3 status of the CPSA. The appellate court failed
to recognize that the release to a FOIA requester is release to the public. See authorities cited in
notes 76-79 infra.
66. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(a), 90 Stat. 1660 (1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 6110(1)).
67. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 314-15, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3439, 3744 (emphasis added). Subsection 6110 (1) is entitled "Exclusive remedy" and pro-
vides in full:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, or with respect to a discovery order made in
connection with a judicial proceeding, the Secretary shall not be required by any Court
to make any written determination or background file document open or available to
public inspection, or to refrain from disclosure of any such documents.
68. Section 6110 as a whole became effective on November 1, 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1201(e), 90 Stat. 1660 (1976). Any files requested pursuant to the FOIA before November 1,
1976, and involved in a FOIA suit commenced before January 1, 1976, are exempt from § 6110
and must be provided to the FOIA requester. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
69. See Grenier v. IRS, 449 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978) (§ 6110 now precludes access via
FOIA requests); Conway v. IRS, 447 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1978) (§ 6110 removes subject matter
jurisdiction for FOIA requester seeking § 6110 information when suit fied after January 1, 1976,
even though FOIA request made prior to effective date of § 6110). See also Fruehauf Corp. v.
IRS, 566 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1977) (action commenced prior to January 1, 1976, may proceed,
although in general § 6110 is now the "exclusive means of public access" to this information). The
Grenier opinion includes extensive history of the cases that prompted the change of procedure
embodied in § 6110. 449 F. Supp. at 836-37.
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Section 6110 was enacted to ensure equal access to materials fall-
ing within the scope of that statute. In blocking access through the
FOIA, Congress demonstrated a preference for total disclosure in lim-
ited locations rather than piecemeal disclosure wherever the FOIA re-
quest originates. Section 6110 and similar legislation enacted to
provide access to agency records outside the FOIA structure70 have the
potential to diminish significantly the central role assumed by the
FOIA during the last decade as a window on governmental operations.
Information acquisition procedures unique to each agency offer an al-
ternative to the broad access provisions of the FOIA and could result in
either more responsive and carefully tailored access or a return to the
secrecy and uncertain effectiveness of pre-FOIA disclosure laws. At
the very least, these statutes will serve to counter the argument that
agencies lack the resources to make information available to the public
within the brief time period allotted by the FOIA.71
The Fourth Circuit offered a troublesome interpretation of
amended Exemption 3 in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v.
Perry.72 The employer-hospital filed a FOIA request, that was subse-
quently denied, for statements taken by the Equal Opportunity Em-
ployment Commission (EEOC) from hospital employees who had filed
employment discrimination charges with the EEOC pursuant to Title
VII.73 At the time of the FOIA request, the EEOC had not filed suit
against the employer-hospital. In opposing disclosure of the employ-
ees' statements to the employer, the EEOC argued that because section
709(e)74 of Title VII prohibits disclosure to the public of investigative
materials gathered by the Commission prior to initiating an action,
70. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1976), which limits access to copies
of articles deposited with the Copyright Office. The legislative history of the new Copyright Act
states that "reproduction and distribution of copyright deposit copies would be made under the
Freedom of Information Act only to the extent permitted by the Copyright Office regulations."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5787. The regulations issued by the Copyright Office severely restrict access to these materi-
als: "Requests for photocopies of copyright deposits will be granted when one or more of the
following conditions are fulfilled: (i) Authorization by owner... (ii) Request by attorney [in con-
nection with related litigation], (iii) Court order." 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(d)(4) (1978). While a central
purpose of the FOIA is to provide access without regard to the identity of the requester, see notes
77-81 infra and accompanying text, the Copyright Office regulations provide for selective disclo-
sure.
71. As one commentator who discussed the burdens placed on agencies by the FOIA ob-
served, "[rleief from such administrative problems [as overloads] comes more appropriately from
Congress than from the courts." Note, Developments Under the Freedom ofInformation Act-
1977, supra note 2, at 199. See also Note, Developments Under the Freedom of lnformation Act-
1976, supra note 2, at 533-41.
72. 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978).
73. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
74. Id. § 2000e-8(e), set out in part in text accompanying note 90 infra.
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Title VII should be classified as an exempting statute under the
FOIA.7 5 Although the EEOC has discretion to provide the employer
directly with information about the charges leveled,76 the EEOC main-
tained that for purposes of FOIA requests the Title VII prohibition of
disclosure to anyone operates to prohibit disclosure to all. The EEOC
relied on the frequent judicial admonitions77 that the FOIA is not
designed to benefit private litigants78 and that the requester's status is
irrelevant to the right to disclosure.7 9 In short, the EEOC argued that
release to "any person"' 0 pursuant to a FOIA request would constitute
release to "the public."'"
The employer-hospital based its claim on the "prima facie right' 2
to disclosure guaranteed by the FOIA, a right that can be denied only if
the requested material falls within one of the narrowly construed ex-
75. For a discussion of the Commission's alternate claim under Exemption 7 of the FOIA for
investigative records, see text accompanying notes 139-55 infra.
76. In fact, the Commission must "serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice)" on the employer. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1976). This section does not, however, specifically require or even authorize disclo-
sure of statements taken by the EEOC after the employee files charges.
77. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("disclosure
under the Act is not to depend upon the needs of a particular litigant").
78. See, e.g., Columbia Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495, 499 (Ist Cir.
1977) ("the disclosure provisions of FOIA are not a substitute for discovery and a party's asserted
need for documents in connection with litigation will not affect, one way or the other, a determi-
nation of whether disclosure is warranted under FOIA").
79. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) (requester's
FOIA rights "are neither increased nor decreased by reason of... an interest.., greater than
that shared by the average member of the public"); Brandon v. Eckard, 569 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Mercy Hosp. v. NLRB, 449 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1978).
Although documents may be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, their exempt status
may not be relied upon to prevent a federal agency from releasing the documents to Congress.
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 585 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denial of injunction against FTC to prevent
transfer of plaintifis trade secrets to Congress even though the material would be exempt under
the FOIA).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
81. See text accompanying note 90 infra. In a case involving an atypical FOIA requester, the
Eighth Circuit forcefully reiterated the FOIA policy of releasing or withholding information with-
out regard to the requester's identity. North Dakota v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1978).
FOIA-exempt documents were held to have lost their exempt status once released to a third party
and could not subsequently be withheld from the plaintiff in that case: "The selective disclosure
exhibited by the government in this action is offensive to the purposes underlying the FOTA and
intolerable as a matter of policy." Id. at 182.
For the argument that exempt information that is not subject to disclosure under the FOIA
may be released to persons chosen by the agency, ie., selective disclosure, see J. O'RELLY, FED-
ERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW § 9.07 (1977), and authori-
ties cited therein. If the EEOC does have this type of discretion with respect to exempt
information, then the Commission could refuse to disclose the exempt statements to the hospital,
as argued by the Commission in response to the FOIA request in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Section
2000e-8(e) would, of course, continue to prevent disclosure to "the public."
82. 571 F.2d at 200.
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emptions. Since Title VII does not prohibit the EEOC from providing
the charged party with information concerning the charges leveled, but
merely proscribes disclosures of investigative materials to the public,
the hospital asserted that its prima facie right to disclosure could not be
denied under Title VII.
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg case illustrates the potential for con-
flict inherent in the policies underlying the FOIA: the overriding goal
of opening up the business of government by disclosing information8 3
to any member of the public, regardless of the identity, status or inter-
ests of the requester,8 4 except when the requested information falls
within one of the narrowly construed statutory exemptions.8 5 The hos-
pital argued in favor of disclosure and a narrow reading of Exemption
3, while the EEOC emphasized the requirement of blindness to the
identity of the requester.
The circuit court ruled in favor of disclosure and a narrow con-
struction, denying the Exemption 3 claim as to the requesting employer
by using a beguiling rationale that misread the exemption. The court
found that "since the EEOC itself claims discretion to disclose or not in
the context of this case, it is not entitled to exemption from disclosure
under the terms of exemption 3, as amended." 6 According to the
court, Title VII "is not a statute prohibiting disclosure to the Hospital
and will not, therefore, defeat the Hospital's 'prima facie right' to dis-
closure, even though it may prohibit disclosure to some other party."8 7
A more appropriate analysis would have focused on the require-
ments for exemption, dealing exclusively with the information sought
rather than the person requesting it, in accordance with the purposes of
the FOIA.ss Exemption 3, as amended, is not available if the withhold-
ing statute leaves discretion with the agency-as section 709(e) of Title
VII arguably does8g-unless the statute specifies the material to be
83. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 38
(Comm. Print 1974).
84. See cases cited in notes 77-79 supra.
85. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citing Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974)).
86. 571 F.2d at 199.
87. Id. at 200-01. But f Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
('We hold that by enacting § 709(e), Congress meant to prohibit the EEOC from giving informa-
tion from its investigative files to any individual outside the government") (citation omitted).
Moreover, the legislative history of the 1976 amendment to Exemption 3 explicitly names § 709(e)
of Title VII as a statute that "could justify withholding under the amended exemption (3)." H.R.
REP. No. 880, supra note 4, at 23.
88. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
89. Since the EEOC must give the employer notice of the charge filed, see note 76 supra, but
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withheld or the criteria to be applied in determining whether informa-
tion should be withheld. Title VII satisfies each of these requirements:
it specifies that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information
obtained by the Comm sion pursuant to its authority under this sec-
tion [to obtain any relevant information] prior to the institution of any
proceeding under [Title VIII." 90 Not all EEOC records are protected
fr6m disclosure: the section is specifically limited to those records gath-
ered by the Commission during its investigation. The criteria for with-
holding specify that the information may not be made public in any
manner, including by resort to the FOIA.
Section 709(e) of Title VII should be considered an Exemption 3
statute.91 Because the requested information falls within the disclosure
prohibition of Title VII, the FOIA should not apply to the request.
Under this analysis, the agency would not be prohibited by other sub-
sections of Title VII from providing the employer with the information
sought indirectly through the FOIA. However, the presence of an Ex-
emption 3 statute and information that falls within the scope of that
statute would serve to eliminate any affirmative FOIA duty to disclose
the information, thus allowing the Commission rather than the courts
to decide whether disclosure would be appropriate under the circum-
stances.
III. WITNESS STATEMENTS AND RELATED AGENCY DOCUMENTS
A. NLRB Witness Statements-A Generic Exemption.
The single FOIA case decided by the Supreme Court during 1978,
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,92 resolved a lopsided split among
the circuits concerning pre-hearing disclosure of witness statements
given to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), statements for
which a claim of exemption as investigatory records93 had been pro-
may not release the information to the public, see text accompanying note 90 infra, as between the
EEOC and the employer, absent the intervening FOIA request, the employer is not "the public."
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
91. If Title VII did not qualify as an Exemption 3 statute and the documents were not other-
wise exempt from disclosure, then disclosure would be required and the requester's identity or
status would be irrelevant. If Title VII did qualify as an Exemption 3 statute, the fact that the
EEOC could, directly and without a FOIA request, provide information to the employer concern-
ing the charges filed against it would be equally irrelevant. The FOIA would not apply to the
information, and disclosure would be governed by the provisions of Title VII.
92. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976), which provides: "This section does not apply to mat-
ters that are... investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records ... would interfere with enforcement proceedings."
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posed. Several circuits94 had endorsed the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit95 that disclosure of witness statements "could well" interfere with
the NLRB's proceedings and that the statements as a class should be
granted a (b)(7)(A) exemption from pre-hearing disclosure.96 The Fifth
Circuit, on the other hand, had refused in Robbins Tire97 to recognize a
per se exemption for witness statements. The Fifth Circuit would have
required a case-by-case inquiry: "would disclosure [pursuant to the
FOIA] actually 'interfere' with the Board's case?" 9
The Supreme Court's decision "that witness statements in pending
unfair labor practice proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclosure
[without the need for case-by-case review] at least until completion of
the Board's hearing" 99 rests on the Court's interpretation of Exemption
7(A) as a "generic" exemption"t° and on its review of the legislative
history of the exemption.10' The Court relied on the distinction drawn
by the language of the FOIA itself between the class of "enforcement
proceedings" included in Exemption 7(A) and the particularity of Ex-
emptions 7(B) through (D)--"a person," "a. . . source"' ° 2 -to justify
a determination that "with respect to particular kinds of enforcement
proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records
while a case is pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement
proceedings.' "103 The Court's finding that NLRB witness statements
qualify as exempt "particular" documents was based upon its examina-
tion of statements made during congressional debate on the original
FOIA and Senate floor debate on the 1974 amendments. Specifically,
94. See, e.g., AMF Head Div. of AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1977); Abra-
hamson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Hardeman Gar-
ment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139
(9th Cir. 1976); New Eng. Med. Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (Ist Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au
& Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Developments Under theFreedom
of Information .4cf-1976, supra note 2, at 547-51; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of In-
formation Act-1975, supra note 2, at 399-408.
95. Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
96. 534 F.2d at 491.
97. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 214
(1978).
98. 563 F.2d at 727 (emphasis added). The circuit court, in requiring evidence of "specific
harm to agency processes that disclosure might produce," id. at 728 n.8, rejected the Board's argu-
ment that disclosure pursuant to an FOIA request would give the plaintiff discovery rights greater
than those available through the Board's own regulations. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (b)(1)
(1978) (access to witness statements). The circuit court also noted that no evidence had been
produced to show that disclosure would result in intimidation. 563 F.2d at 732.
99. 437 U.S. at 236.
100. Id. at 224.
101. Id. at 224-36.
102. Id. at 223-24; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
103. 437 U.S. at 236.
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the Court considered the concern expressed by Senator Humphrey dur-
ing the original FOIA debates that potential witnesses for NLRB pro-
ceedings "would be loath to give statements"' 4 if there were a
possibility that those statements would be disclosed prior to the hear-
ing.' °5 The Court also noted Senator Hart's statements in 1974 that the
amendments to Exemption 7 were "by no means a radical departure
from existing case law."'106 The Court concluded that Exemption 7, as
amended in 1974 to eliminate its connection with discovery procedures,
continued to provide exemption for certain types of documents such as
NLRB witness statements, notwithstanding respondent's argument that
Congress intended to require a case-by-case showing of interference.10 7
The final step in granting a generic exemption for NLRB witness state-
ments'08 was the Court's determination that the "profound altera-
104. S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1964), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D
SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTI-
CLES 111 (Comm. Print 1974).
105. Senator Humphrey's concerns were not limited to NLRB proceedings. His amendment
to the proposed exemption for investigatory files would have exempted "statement[s] of agency
witnesses until such witnesses are called to testify in an action or proceeding." S. REP. No. 1219,
supra note 104, at 110 (emphasis added). Had this amendment been enacted as part of the FOIA,
the problem of adapting the Supreme Court's decision in Robbins Tire to witness statements ob-
tained by other federal agencies might have been avoided. See text accompanying notes 139-55
infra.
In response to Senator Humphrey's concerns, the language of the original Exemption 7 (in-
vestigatory files are exempt "until they ... affect an action or proceeding," S. Doc. No. 82, supra
note 104, at 99) was changed to provide exemption "except to the extent available by law to a
party other than an agency." Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(7), 80 Stat. 251 (1966). See O'REILLY,
supra note 81, §§ 17.05-17.06.
106. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT & AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUB. L. No.
93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 334 (Joint
Comm. Print 1975).
107. 437 U.S. at 234. Robbins argued that the language of the FOIA, considered in its en-
tirety, requires individualized determinations. Records may be examined in camera in order to
identify segregable, disclosable portions of otherwise exempt documents. The exemptions -ordi-
narily place the burden on the agency to establish the appropriateness of non-disclosure in a
particular case, rather than on the requester to justify disclosure of what might be considered
secret information. See also authorities cited in notes 111-12 infra.
108. The Robbins Tire court did not include in the generic exemption witness statements ob-
tained during an investigation of a challenge to an NLRB representation election. However, the
same rationale that exempts statements taken during unfair labor practice proceedings applies to
election proceedings: in both instances, the requester's prior access would, under the Supreme
Court's analysis, "disturb the existing balance of relations," 437 U.S. at 236, between the parties
and would violate Board policies governing discovery and interfere with an ongoing investigation.
The First Circuit so held in Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978),
noting in addition that Boston University's method for challenging the election was to refuse to
bargain with the new union, thereby triggering an unfair labor practice charge with subsequent
review in the courts. Id. at 310. The similarity between the interference caused by disclosure in
unfair labor practice proceedings and in election proceedings was also emphasized by the brief
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tion"° 9 in strategy that would occur if NLRB witness statements were
disclosed prior to the Board's hearing would constitute sufficient inter-
ference to outweigh the presumption in favor of disclosure in every
FOIA case." 0
The Robbins Tire decision is expansive in that the Court unani-
mously agreed to authorize a per se exemption to the FOIA despite
congressional I I and prior judicial language" 12 calling for a case-by-
case examination of the agency's exemption claim. However, the ex-
emption is limited in such a way that many questions are left unan-
swered. For example, three members of the Court"13 joined the
opinion with the understanding that its rationale should not be limited
to the NLRB, but should apply "equally to any enforcement proceed-
ing."" 4  Two members of the Court"' agreed that employees' state-
ments criticizing their current employer should be exempt in every
case, but felt that favorable statements and the unfavorable statements
of former employees should be disclosed because questions of coercion
or intimidation would not be relevant." 6 This procedure would create
a hybrid standard combining case-by-case review with the generic ex-
emption. Although none of the three opinions in Robbins Tire dis-
cussed a generic exemption for other types of NLRB records, several
lower federal courts have recently addressed this question as well as the
applicability of Exemption 7(A) to the proceedings of other federal
order in Fotomat Corp. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1978), in which the court affirmed a
district court decision not to compel disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses in an
election challenge. Without distinguishing between the two types of NLRB proceedings, the Foto-
mat court relied on NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977), an unfair
labor practice case.
109. 437 U.S. at 237.
110. In particular, the Court stated that coercion and deterrence from speaking out are very
real possibilities, id. at 239, despite the prohibitions against intimidation contained in the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). Both favorable and unfavorable statements of
employees and non-employees were included within the court's interpretation of the exemption in
order to deprive the alleged violator of any opportunity to frustrate the proceedings or "construct
defenses which would permit violations to go unremedied." 437 U.S. at 241 (quoting Title Guar-
antee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976)). See also New
Eng. Med. Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1977).
111. See, e.g., 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 106, at 293, 333.
112. See, e.g., Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D.C. Kan. 1975), rey'd, 542
F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976).
113. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.
114. 437 U.S. at 243. See text accompanying notes 139-55 infra.
115. Justices Powell and Brennan.
116. 437 U.S. at 252-54. The favorable/unfavorable classification would place a heavy burden
on courts to evaluate the overall content of witness statements and presumably to segregate
favorable portions for disclosure. Exemption 7 relates to proceedings, not witness attitudes, and
determinations of exempt material should focus on interference with the proceeding, not interfer-
ence with the witnesses' personal lives or employment status.
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agencies.
B. NLRB Documents in Other Contexts.
Federal courts have equated disclosure of witness statements taken
by the NLRB during unfair labor proceedings with disclosure of simi-
lar statements taken during union election challenge proceedings.
1 7
However, the exemption granted in each of these situations has not
been extended to witness statements taken on deposition in a private,
non-NLRB civil action. In Halloran v. Fisher Foods, Inc.,'18 a private
action not involving a request for information under the FOIA, a group
of employees filed a class action suit against their employer, alleging
breach of duty. On deposition the plaintiff union employees refused to
answer questions relevant to a parallel unfair labor practice proceeding
before the NLRB, citing two FOIA cases, Title Guarantee Co. v.
NLRB119 and NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp.,120 for the proposi-
tion that witness statements are exempt from disclosure when "devel-
oped within and part of" the pending NLRB action.' 2 ' In denying the
plaintiffs' objection and ordering them to answer the deposition ques-
tions the court emphasized the difference between the nature of the
NLRB proceeding and that of the private lawsuit as well as the distinc-
tion between the limited discovery policy of the NLRB, 2 2 noted in
Robbins Tire 23 and its predecessors, 24 and the more lenient discovery
policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 The court refused
to apply a judicial standard developed in response to the relationship
between the FOIA and NLRB proceedings in the context of a non-
FOIA, non-NLRB suit.
FOIA requests for NLRB documents continue to elicit inconsis-
tent judicial responses in the area of personal files (Exemption 6). 126
117. See note 108 supra.
118. 42 Ad. L.2d 239 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
119. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
120. 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
121. 42 Ad: L.2d at 241.
122. The NLRB discovery policy is authorized by § 6 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1978) ("Witnesses, Depositions, and Subpenas"); 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.118 (1978) (restrictions on production of or testimony concerning NLRB records and docu-
ments).
123. 437 U.S. at 236-38, 241.
124. See cases cited in note 94 supra.
125. FED. R. Cwv. P. 26-37.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976), which provides in full: "This section does not apply to mat-
ters that are personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." This exemption, and union authorization
cards in particular, is discussed in Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-
1977, supra note 2, at 212-16.
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Union authorization cards are claimed by the NLRB to be exempt
from disclosure as personal files, a position first accepted by the Third
Circuit in Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB12 7 and more recently
espoused by the Fifth Circuit in Pac/c Molasses Co. v. NLRB.12 8 The
Pac/c Molasses court effectively skirted the issue of how an em-
ployee's name and address could be classified as "intimate details' 2 9
so personal as to fall within Exemption 6 by emphasizing another test:
the extent of the invasion of privacy that could result from disclo-
sure. 130 The court found a very strong privacy interest, as had the Ma-
sonic Homes court,' 3 ' but apparently did not consider it necessary to
link that interest to a statutorily exempt document. 32
The dissent in Pacofc Molasses focused on the majority's failure to
determine the exempt status of the authorization cards on the basis of
the documents themselves, rather than the interests at stake. It ob-
served that the cards were the property of the union rather than the
company and contained only names, addresses and work data, not fam-
ily history or any of the evaluative data ordinarily found in personnel
or "similar" files. In fact, the employer had access to the data on the
cards through its own fies. The employer's real goal was to obtain
access to the signatures-information that the dissent declined to clas-
sify as "personnel" or "similar to personnel" information. 133
[The majority's] result has been reached by reverse reasoning and, in
my opinion, contrary to the expressed intent and purpose of Con-
gress. Under this holding any invasion of personal privacy would
result in non-disclosure regardless of whether the material was [an
Exemption 6 document].
... The test under Exemption 6 should not be whether the ma-
terial is personal or private, but whether or not it is a personnel, med-
ical or similar file, and, if not, as in the case before us, it must be
disclosed.' 34
A year prior to the Pacfic Molasses decision a federal district court
127. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
128. 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978); accord, United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F. Supp.
407 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
129. 577 F.2d at 1180 (quoting Rural Hous. Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
130. 577 F.2d at 1181.
131. 556 F.2d at 220-21.
132. 577 F.2d at 1185-86 (Skelton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 1186.
134. Id. at 1188. Also, see National Treasury Employees Union, 43 Ad. L.2d 462 (F.C.C.
1978) for an agency's partial denial of a FOIA request for names and addresses "of all bargaining
unit employees of the Commission." Id. at 463. The employees' addresses, but not their names,
were considered exempt because disclosure would constitute an Exemption 6 invasion of privacy.
The Commission did not discuss to what extent, if any, the addresses constituted "personnel" or
"similar" files.
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had held, without explanation, that union authorization cards were
"similar" Exemption 6 files.135 The court did conclude, however, that
the NLRB and the Masonic Homes opinion had erred in claiming that
disclosure would "chill" employees' exercise of their rights to organize
and bargain.'36 In the court's view, the employer was merely "in-
vok[ing] the procedure provided by law for obtaining agency
records"137-- the FOIA-and the cards were not exempt from disclo-
sure. 1
3 8
The continuing debate over the FOIA status of union authoriza-
tion cards illustrates the difficult task faced by the courts in addressing
issues not anticipated by the language or legislative history of the Act.
The dissent in Pacific Molasses correctly noted that the cards should
not be treated as Exemption 6 files. However, thepublic interest would
not appear to require disclosure of the union preferences of individual
employees. Until either the FOIA or the National Labor Relations Act
is amended to resolve the issue, the courts should continue to order
disclosure of such information in order to prevent Exemption 6 from
becoming a vehicle for federal agencies to withhold information that
should be available to the public.
C. Witness Statements and Other Agencies.
Statements taken from parties filing an employment discrimina-
tion charge with the EEOC under Title VII 13 9 provided the background
for the court's finding in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v.
Perry4 ° that Exemption 7(A) does not provide a per se exemption for
witness statements.' 4' The Charlotte-Mecklenburg court, referring fre-
quently to the Fifth Circuit's now overruled 42 decision in Robbins
135. Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 444 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
136. Id. at 844.
137. Id. at 845.
138. In a situation analogous to NLRB authorization procedures, an employer sought disclo-
sure of the number of authorization cards submitted to the National Mediation Board in a quest
for union certification. American Airlines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., [1979] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH)(85 Lab. Cas.) 10,971, at 19,729 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1978). The Mediation Board claimed two
exemptions, Exemption 7(A) for investigatory files and Exemption 4 for trade secrets. The court
granted Exemption 4 status to the number of cards, based on "the clearly commercial nature of
the activity of a labor organization seeking to organize and its substantial effect on commerce," id.
at 19,733, and the "apparent" harm to the union's competitive position if the information were
disclosed.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
140. 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978).
141. For a discussion of the court's additional holding that Title VII is not an Exemption 3
statute, at least in the instant case, see notes 72-91 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 92-116 supra and accompanying text.
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Tire, ' 43 denied exemption to statements taken by EEOC investigators
in the initial stages of an investigation and prior to the filing of an
action under Title VII without undertaking a case-by-case review. The
court was unable to reconcile a generic exemption with the legislative
history' 44 and text 41 of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA;14 the in-
tent of Congress was interpreted to require an in camera, factual in-
quiry. 147 After making such an inquiry, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
court concluded that statements of current employees should be ex-
empt, but ordered disclosure of statements made by past employees.
148
This result is almost identical to the outcome favored by the dissenting
opinion of Justices Powell and Brennan in Robbins Tire.149
Neither the Supreme Court majority in Robbins Tire nor the
Fourth Circuit in Charlotte-Mecklenburg openly advocated the applica-
tion of different standards in evaluating FOIA requests made to the
NLRB as opposed to other federal agencies. However, the concurring
Justices in Robbins Tire would have extended the per se exemption to
other agencies, making it equally applicable to "any enforcement pro-
ceeding."'5 0 Nonetheless, the Robbins Tire majority did emphasize the
particular concern for NLRB proceedings exhibited by Congress at the
time the original FOIA was enacted' 5 ' and interpreted the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments to preserve that concern.' 5 2 The Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg decision appears to force the issue: the courts must
either acknowledge that special treatment will be afforded to the
NLRB, despite the fact that the language of the FOIA is agency-neutral
and that the "overriding purpose"'153 of the Act is to disclose informa-
tion except in the presence of an exemption narrowly construed, 54 or
143. 563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
144. 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 106, at 293, 333.
145. See note 93 supra.
146. 571 F.2d at 201-02.
147. Id. at 202.
148. Id. at 202-03.
149. 437 U.S. at 252-54. See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
150. 437 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). A District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court case decided after Robbins Tire provides a further illustration of the difference of opin-
ion among the courts concerning the scope of the Robbins Tire decision. Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,227 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Two circuit judges insisted that in
order to keep investigative documents secret the FTC must show that release in the particular case
would interfere with enforcement proceedings. The dissenting third judge urged adoption of the
Robbins Tire standard, claiming that disclosure would go beyond the agency's own rules of dis-
covery and would constitute "interference" without a factual showing of interference in the partic-
ular situation.
151. 437 U.S. at 225-26.
152. Id. at 232.
153. See text accompanying notes 83-85 su.pra.
154. See note 85 supra.
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provide an explicit statement of the Supreme Court's inference that the
proceedings of the NLRB do warrant separate consideration because
the danger of "disturb[ing] the existing balance of relations" '155 is some-
how greater for the NLRB than for analogous proceedings before other
agencies such as the EEOC.
IV. REVERSE-FOIA SUITS
The efforts of individuals or corporations who are required to sub-
mit information to federal agencies to enjoin disclosure of that infor-
mation pursuant to an FOIA request-the so-called "reverse-FOIA"
suits' 56-- continue to produce inconsistent judicial results and have re-
cently prompted an investigation of the problem by a House of Repre-
sentatives committee.1 57 The courts are not in agreement as to the
source of the cause of action in a reverse-FOIA lawsuit, the agency's
discretion to disclose FOIA-exempt information, or the proper stan-
dard of judicial review to be applied in evaluating a decision to enjoin
disclosure.
Two lines of decision have emerged. Courts adopting' 8 the ap-
proach articulated in Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger159 find no authority
for a cause of action in either the FOIA itself1 60 or the Trade Secrets
Act.' 61 These circuits recognize a cause of action only under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).162 The APA provides for limited
review of federal agencies' decisions to determine agency abuse or arbi-
trary behavior' 63 and the courts have premised a cause of action on the
agency's authority to disclose exempt information.' 64 On the other
hand, courts adopting the approach developed in extended litigation'
65
involving the Westinghouse Corporation have found an implied cause
155. 437 U.S. at 236.
156. See note 8 supra.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1382, supra note 10. See text accompanying note 212 infra.
158. See note 186 infra.
159. 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacatedand remandedsub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
160. See text accompanying notes 167-86 infra.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), set out in part in note 175 infra.
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
163. Id. § 706, set out in part in note 183 infra.
164. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (the exemptions represent "the congressional
determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep
confidential, if it so chooses") (emphasis added).
165. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.-Research & Dev. Center v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1977);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974), a'd, 542 F.2d 1190
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
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of action for the submitter in the FOIA 66 and express authorization for
such a cause of action in the Trade Secrets Act. These courts conduct a
de novo review of the agency's actions in deciding whether to disclose
information; if the information is found by the court to be exempt, then
it may not be disclosed.
The Chrysler16 7 court's rationale, relied on by two other circuit
courts and by district courts in another circuit, 168 rests on its initial
finding that a cause of action exists under the FOIA only for persons
seeking disclosure and not for persons resisting disclosure. The FOIA
forbids withholding non-exempt information 69 and provides a judicial
remedy to requesters wrongfully denied disclosure.170 According to the
Chrysler line of cases, however, the FOIA does not mandate withhold-
ing exempt information 17 1 and consequently does not provide a judicial
remedy for the submitter when an agency chooses to disclose exempt
information. 72 After citing legislative history 173 in support of its inter-
pretation of the general exemption subsection of the FOIA, the court
stated that "either a mandatory duty of non-disclosure or a cause of
action to prevent disclosure would be inconsistent with the basic pur-
pose of the FOIA, which. . is that of full agency disclosure to pro-
vide the public with speedy access to relevant information."'"'
The Chrysler court also refused to recognize a cause of action
under the Trade Secrets Act,175 since disclosure could, in accordance
with that statute, be "authorized by law" pursuant to regulations issued
by the agency under the authority of the federal housekeeping stat-
ute. 176  Agency regulations "have the force of law for purposes of
166. See text accompanying notes 187-199 infra.
167. Chrysler sought to prevent disclosure of employment statistics and affirmative action in-
formation submitted to appropriate federal agencies. The circuit court remanded to the agency
for lack of an adequate record on which to assess the issue of agency discretion or abuse.
168. See note 186 infra.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).
170. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
171. 565 F.2d at 1185.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5-7, reprintedin [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2419, 2422-2424; S. REP. No. 813, supra note 83, at 45.
174. 565 F.2d at 1185 (citation omitted).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), which reads in part:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States ... publishes, di-
vulges, discloses or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law
any information. . . which. . . concerns or relates to the trade secrets [or confidential
business information] of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association...
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
shall be removed from office or employment (emphasis added).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), which reads in part: "The head of an Executive department...
may prescribe regulations for. . . the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and
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§ 1905,"'17 the Trade Secrets Act, as recognized by a prior decision of
the same circuit178 and by legislative history. 17 9
The court was willing to review the agency's action under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,' 80 however, because a person submitting
information to a federal agency and later resisting disclosure of that
information may "suffer legal wrong because of agency action"1' in
disclosing pursuant to the FOIA. 181 Judicial review by courts adhering
to the Chrysler analysis is limited, therefore, to an examination of the
agency record as provided in the APA. 183 The Chrysler court suggested
the following analysis. 184 First, a court must determine whether an Ex-
emption 3 statute or regulation applies. If so, the agency abuses its
discretion if it discloses the information. If no Exemption 3 statute ap-
plies, the next consideration is whether the agency used the correct
standard in determining that no other FOIA exemptions applied. If the
agency decided to disclose the information after determining that it was
exempt, the court must determine whether the agency used the correct
standard in finding an exemption and whether the agency followed its
own regulations in deciding to disclose. If the court cannot determine
on the basis of the agency record whether the agency abused its discre-
tion, the court must "remand to the agency for an additional record or
explanation";8 5 the court may not itself decide the substantive merits
of the case.18 6
property. This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public."
177. 565 F.2d at 1186.
178. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82, 94 (3d Cir. 1977)
(although the regulations here were issued under 42 U.S.C. § 103(b)(3) (1976) and not under 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1976)).
179. 565 F.2d at 1186-87, and authorities cited therein.
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
181. Id. § 702.
182. 565 F.2d at 1190-91.
183. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), which provides in part:
The reviewing court shall. . .(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law,.. . [or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, author-
ity, or limitations. . . . In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error.
184. 565 F.2d at 1192.
185. Id.
186. For a fuller discussion of a similar analytical approach, see Clement, supra note 8, at 632.
Several courts have explicitly adopted the analytical approach of the Chrysler court. Three
months after the Third Circuit's Chrysler decision, twelve television manufacturers, in GTE Syl-
vania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977), successfully
enjoined disclosure of data concerning television-related accidents to Consumers Union. To reach
its decision, the Delaware District Court stated that its "determinations... concerning the scope
of judicial review and the materials to be reviewed comport completely with the principles ex-
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Submitters of information seeking to enjoin FOIA disclosure will
find a more hospitable forum in the Fourth Circuit, the locus of the
major Westinghouse decisions. The circuit court in Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp. v. Schlesinger (Westinghouse) 18 7 found an implied cause of
action in the FOIA itself based on the right of a "private party to pro-
tect his right to protection from disclosure, stated as a general over-all
legislative policy in Exemption 4."1' 8 At least when trade secrets are
involved, 8 9 the Fourth Circuit reads the FOIA exemption as protective
of personal rights as well as of governmental secrecy interests. 90 The
same trade secrets claim will provide the basis for the submitter's cause
of action under the Trade Secrets Act' 9 ' because, in the view of the
Westinghouse court, section 1905 mandates non-disclosure of trade
secrets information meeting the requirements of Exemption 4.192 The
pressed in the Chrysler case," id. at 1162 n.32, and the court applied the Chrysler analysis point by
point. Id. at 1160-61. Litigation over this same accident data continues in the District of Colum-
bia courts. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, No.
75-2059 (D.C. Cir., filed Dec. 22, 1978).
Data submitted by a pesticide manufacturer to the Environmental Protection Agency was
claimed by the company to be exempt from disclosure in Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 443 F.
Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The district court relied on Chrysler to set the level of review at
"agency abuse" rather than permitting de novo review of the agency's decision to make the data
public. Id. at 1029-30. In passing, the court agreed with Chrysler that the FOIA exemptions do
not alone mandate withholding and that the Trade Secrets Act "may not afford affirmative relief
against disclosure." Id. at 1032.
In a reverse-FOIA case which, like Chrysler, involved employment information submitted by
a federal contractor, General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), the
Eighth Circuit called the Chrysler decision "a well-reasoned opinion," id. at 1216, and proceeded
to follow both its reasoning and analysis: exemptions are permissive, no cause of action exists
under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), and the scope of review is limited to "agency abuse." Another
federal contractor's employment data had been ordered withheld by a district court, but in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit lifted the injunction
because the submitter seeking the injunction had no cause of action under the Trade Secrets Act.
This court cited both General Dynamics and Chrysler for the position that valid regulations are
sufficient "authority" under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), see note 175 supra, to fall within the exemp-
tion to the Trade Secrets Act's withholding requirement, 575 F.2d at 1202, and that the FOIA
itself provides a cause of action only for the person seeking disclosure. Id. at 1203.
187. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); see Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, supra note 2, at 562-63.
188. 542 F.2d at 1214.
189. Presumably, the court would extend its finding of mandatory non-disclosure to include
the personal private information protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C).
190. The legislative history of the original FOIA fully supports the court's position:
At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is enacted
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect
to certain information in Government files .... It is also necessary for the very opera-
tion of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain material....
S. REt. No. 813, supra note 83, at 38.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), set out in part in note 175 supra.
192. 542 F.2d at 1198, 1202-03. The Westinghouse decision included a finding that § 1905 was
a qualifying Exemption 3 statute that prohibited disclosure. The legislative history of the 1976
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Westinghouse court also held de novo review of the matter to be appro-
priate; if a court determines that the trade secrets exemption applies the
court must order non-disclosure.1 93  Because the FOIA provides a
cause of action for requesters and the court found an implied cause of
action under the FOIA for submitters as well, the fact that de novo
review is appropriate in an action by the requester indicates that de
novo review Will also be appropriate in an action by the submitter.1 94
According to the Westinghouse court, "[iut would be an incredible
rule"'195 if the agency's actions in violation of section 1905 could only
be examined for arbitrariness.
The latest Westinghouse reverse-FOIA decision, Westinghouse
Electric Corp.-Research & Development Center v. Brown (Westinghouse
Research),196 came after the Chrysler decision and commented on the
differing approaches of the two circuits. Westinghouse Research specifi-
cally endorsed the earlier holdings of its own circuit court, that section
190517 and the FOIA both provide a cause of action to the submitter
and that a "full trial at which the Court determines de novo the plain-
tiffs right to have the information ordered withheld"'98 is required.
Unfortunately, the district court did not conduct a comparative analy-
sis of the Chrysler and earlier Westinghouse decisions, but merely in-
voked its obligation to follow its own circuit's decisions.' 99
amendment to the FOIA, see text accompanying notes 40-42 supra, indicates that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 (1976) no longer qualifies for Exemption 3 status, but "if material is within the trade secrets
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act and therefore subject to disclosure if the agency
determines that disclosure is in the public interest, section 1905 must be considered to ascertain
whether the agency is forbidden from disclosing the information." H.R. REP. No. 880, supra note
4, at 23.
193. 542 F.2d at 1215.
194. Id. at 1213-14.
195. Id. at 1215.
196. 443 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1977).
197. The Westinghouse Research court, like the Chrysler court, used a piggyback approach to
§ 1905, but to reach opposite results: in Westinghouse Research, § 1905 was held to prohibit dis-
closure because Exemption 4 removed the information from FOIA coverage. Thus, disclosure
was "not authorized by law" and § 1905 applied to protect the information. In Chrysler, on the
other hand, § 1905 was irrelevant because disclosure was "authorized by law" because the regula-
tions were made pursuant to another federal statute. See text accompanying notes 175-79 supra.
198. 443 F. Supp. at 1232.
199. Id. A more recent reverse-FOIA case from a district court in the Fourth Circuit, Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736 (D. Md. 1978), involved information submitted
to several federal agencies as part of an investigation of the religious composition of Nationwide's
work force. Following its own circuit's decision in Westinghouse, the district court recognized an
"implied right of action under the FOIA itself' for the submitter. Id. at 741. The agencies had
determined that no exemptions applied, making disclosure mandatory. After a de novo examina-
tion of the submitter's arguments for exemption, the court concluded that Exemption 3 did not
apply because the Trade Secrets Act was too broad and that Exemption 6 did not apply since only
statistics and not employees' names had been submitted to the agencies.
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The clearest illustration of the divergent judicial approaches taken
in reverse-FOIA lawsuits in 1978 is found in two district court cases
from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, Humana of Virginia, Inc. v. Blue
Cross200 and Doctors Hospital Inc. v. Califano.20 Both suits were initi-
ated by Medicare health care providers in an attempt to enjoin disclo-
sure of cost reports submitted to HEW. The plaintiffs challenged an
HEW regulation that provides that "[ulpon request in writing, cost re-
ports submitted by providers of [health care services] ... to enable the
Secretary to determine amounts due such providers" shall be made
available to the public.2"2 The Humana court, following the decisions
of its own circuit in the Westinghouse cases, stated that the FOIA gave
Humana the right to seek an injunction and that the Trade Secrets Act
would forbid disclosure if the trade secrets exemption applied to the
cost reports. 3  Finding the cost reports clearly commercial, financial
and confidential, the court prohibited disclosure and, by implication,
found the HEW regulation invalid.2"
The Doctors Hospital court used the Chrysler approach in declar-
ing that the FOIA is not a prohibitory statute.20 5 Consequently, the
question of exemption for trade secrets or commercial information was
relevant only in determining whether the agency had abused its discre-
tion. According to that court, even if the cost reports did constitute
trade secrets, their exemption would allow the agency to decide
whether to disclose the material. Only the validity of the regulation
was at issue. If the regulation was valid, disclosure would be "author-
ized" and the Trade Secrets Act would not apply.206 The court bal-
anced the strong public interest in disclosure against the minimal
interest in secrecy of physicians who are "not compet[ing] in the market
place" 207 and who choose to participate in the Medicare program. In
finding the regulation valid, the court emphasized the distinction be-
tween these voluntary participants and regulated industries that are
forced to submit confidential commercial information to the federal
government in order to exist.20 Thus, one district court ordered disclo-
sure as required by the FOIA and an agency regulation and another
prohibited disclosure as unauthorized by either the FOIA or the regula-
200. 455 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Va. 1978).
201. 455 F. Supp. 476 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
202. 20 C.F.R. § 422.435(c) (1978).
203. 455 F. Supp. at 1176.
204. Id. at 1179.
205. 455 F. Supp. at 479.
206. Id. at 481-82.
207. Id. at 480.
208. Id. at 481.
[Vol. 1979:327
FOA DEVELOPMENTS
tion. In these two cases, the courts' decisions on the issue of whether
FOIA exemptions should be regarded as mandatory or permissive ef-
fectively dictated the outcome of the cases. The other two major issues
in reverse-FOIA lawsuits, the source of the cause of action and the
209 nteescope of judicial review, were not even addressed by the Doctors
Hospital court.
The continuing uncertainty surrounding the reverse-FOIA suit has
provoked more than judicial response. One commentator, critical of
the restricted review of the Chrysler court, urges an amendment to the
FOIA that would require agencies to notify submitters of "private, con-
fidential" information prior to release under the FOIA and that would
give the submitter an explicit cause of action in the district court, with
the court determining de novo the existence of an exemption and the
public interest in disclosure or non-disclosure.21 ° Others assume that
the Chrysler decision was correct, that Congress intended that the ex-
emptions be permissive in nature, and presumably that the "abuse of
discretion" standard is the appropriate standard of review.21 1 The
House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations has
responded to the reverse-FOIA confusion by issuing a report2& 1 2 analyz-
ing the judicial decisions and recommending procedures for agencies
that deal with business data, procedures that would include notice to
the submitters prior to FOIA disclosure. The Committee's report advo-
cates amendment of the FOIA to embrace the "abuse of discretion"
standard of Chrysler in the event that the Supreme Court's decision in
Chrysler does not prove adequate to solve the scope-of-review prob-
lem.213
CONCLUSION
Of the four categories of significant FOIA litigation in 1978, only
209. See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
210. O'REILLY, supra note 81, § 10.10.
211. Lynch, Cohn & Vladek, Exemption 4, in LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT 28 (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978); Comment, supra note 8, at 1009-
11. See generally Clement, supra note 8.
212. H.R. REP. No. 1382, supra note 10.
213. Id. 4. On April 18, 1979, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision in
Chrysler and remanded to the district court for a determination of the applicability of the Trade
Secrets Act to the documents involved. The Court affirmed that neither the FOIA nor the Trade
Secrets Act gives the submitter a private cause of action to enjoin disclosure, but that judicial
review is available through the Administrative Procedure Act. In addition, the Court confirmed
the permissive nature of the FOIA exemptions, so that even if an exemption applies, the agency
may still release the documents unless another statute prohibits disclosure; the decision to disclose
would then be subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 97 S.
Ct. 1705 (1979).
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one-the Exemption 3 litigation-is likely to recede in importance in
the near future. So long as the courts continue to apply a two-part test
to determine whether statutes qualify under Exemption 3-allowing
withholding either in the absence of discretion or in the presence of
specific criteria-then the classification of qualifying statutes and ex-
empt information should remain a straightforward process.
Litigation will continue, however, in the areas of private research
data and other "obtainable" records until the courts fashion more de-
finitive contours for the concepts of agency "control," "ownership" and
"possession." There are also a number of unanswered questions con-
cerning investigative records that may be protected by Exemption 7,
particularly the problem of different judicial treatment of various agen-
cies. Finally, even if the Supreme Court does establish a clear standard
of review for reverse-FOIA cases, submitters of information will con-
tinue to seek protection under the vague trade secrets exemption.
214
Priscilla P. Weaver
214. For an extensive discussion of this problem, see Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety andEffec-
tiveness Data: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 1979 DuKE LJ. 286.
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